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INTRODUCTION 
While not breaking any new ground, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (“Federal Circuit”) trademark 
decisions rendered during 2010 provide colorful applications of well-
founded substantive trademark law principles and illustrate 
numerous procedural cautionary tales.  During 2010, the Federal 
Circuit issued twenty-three trademark decisions1 and designated eight 
                                                          
 1. In re Sharp, No. 2010-1148, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 
2010) (per curiam); Bell’s Brewery, Inc. v. Bell Hill Vineyards, L.L.C., No. 2010-1280, 
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25499 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2010) (per curiam); ERBE 
Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Technology L.L.C., 629 F.3d 1278, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Anthony’s Pizza Holding Co. v. Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta 
Int’l, Inc., No. 2010-1191, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23898 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2010) (per 
curiam); Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2010-1422, 2010 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 26870 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2010); In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 
1346, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Green Edge Enters. v. Rubber Mulch Etc., 
L.L.C., 620 F.3d 1287, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re The Lex 
Group VA, 383 F. App’x 949 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Outdoor Kids, Inc. v. 
Parris Mfg. Co., 385 F. App’x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Deere & Co. v. ITC, 605 F.3d 
1350, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Sadeh v. Biggs, 374 F. App’x 996 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Fred Beverages, Inc. v. Fred’s Capital Mgmt. Co., 605 
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as precedential.2  One case consisted of an appeal from the United 
States International Trade Commission (“ITC”),3 two cases were 
appeals from decisions by United States District Courts,4 and the 
remaining twenty cases consisted of appeals from the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office’s (“Trademark Office”) Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or the “Board”).   
Of the twenty cases appealed from the TTAB, seven involved an ex 
parte appeal of application refusals,5 five involved cancellation 
proceedings, including one cancellation counterclaim,6 eight 
involved opposition proceedings,7 and one involved a consolidated 
cancellation and opposition proceeding.8  Five of the eight 
precedential trademark decisions predominantly involved substantive 
                                                          
F.3d 963, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1958 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Achenbach Buschhutten 
GmbH, No. 2010-1192, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12248 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2010); Crash 
Dummy Movie, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010); Odom’s Tenn. Pride Sausage, Inc. v. FF Acquisition, L.L.C., 600 F.3d 
1343, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2030 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Campbell v. Bassani Mfg., 368 F. 
App’x 133 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), reh’g denied, No. 2009-1534, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9432 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2010); Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., 367 F. App’x 
161 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); In re Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc., 367 Fed. App’x 144 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Stoller v. Best Data Prods., Inc., No. 2010-1031, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 4354 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2010); Univ. of S.C. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 367 F. 
App’x 129 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 387 (2010); Found. for a Christian 
Civilization, Inc. v. Mary Queen of the Third Millenium, Inc., 360 F. App’x 150 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (per curiam); In re Hyatt, No. 2009-1229, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26199 
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 7, 2010).  
 2. ERBE, 629 F.3d 1278, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048; In re Chippendales, 622 F.3d 
1346, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681; Green Edge, 620 F.3d 1287, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1425; Deere, 605 F.3d 1350, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206; Fred Beverages, 605 F.3d 963, 
94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1958; Mattel, 601 F.3d 1387, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315; In re 
Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257; Odom’s, 600 F.3d 1343, 93 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2030. 
 3. Deere, 605 F.3d 1350, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206. 
 4. ERBE, 629 F.3d 1278, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048; Green Edge, 620 F.3d 1287, 
96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425. 
 5. In re Sharp, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356 at *1; In re Chippendales, 622 F.3d at 
1348, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681; In re The Lex Group, 383 F. App’x at 949; In re 
Achenbach, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12248 at *1; In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d at 1344, 
94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257; In re Mi Pueblo, 367 Fed. App’x at *1; In re Hyatt, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 26199 at *1. 
 6. Gen. Cas. Co., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26870 at *1; Outdoor Kids, 385 F. App’x at 
993; Fred Beverages, 605 F.3d at 964, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958; Super Bakery, 367 F. 
App’x at 162; Univ. of S.C., 367 F. App’x at 131 (cancellation counterclaim). 
 7. Bell’s Brewery, Inc. v. Bell Hill Vineyards, L.L.C., No. 2010-1280, 2010 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 25499, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2010) (per curiam); Sadeh v. Biggs, 374 
F. App’x 996, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Mattel, 601 F.3d at 1389, 94 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315; Odom’s, 600 F.3d at 1344, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2030; 
Campbell v. Bassani Mfg., 368 F. App’x 133, 133 (Fed. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, No. 
2009-1534, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 9432 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2010); Super Bakery, 367 F. 
App’x at 162; Univ. of S.C., 367 F. App’x at 131; Found. for a Christian Civilization, 
Inc. v. Mary Queen of the Third Millenium, Inc., 360 F. App’x 150, 150 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (per curiam). 
 8. Anthony’s Pizza Holding Co. v. Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta Int’l, Inc., No. 2010-
1191, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23898, at *1–2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2010) (per curiam). 
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issues,9 two predominantly involved TTAB procedural issues,10 and 
one presented both significant substantive and procedural issues.11 
Of note, in five of the six per curiam cases, the Federal Circuit 
rendered judgments without written opinions after the parties had 
fully briefed and argued the appeals.12  Each of these judgments 
affirmed the decision of the TTAB, and all related to substantive 
trademark issues.  Consequently, in 2010, thirty-three percent of all 
appeals of substantive trademark issues to the Federal Circuit resulted 
in the Federal Circuit affirming without a written opinion.   
In fourteen of fifteen appeals of substantive trademark law issues, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s or district court’s decision; 
often, this was because the Board or court had evaluated and weighed 
evidence relating to likelihood of confusion, abandonment, inherent 
distinctiveness, genericism, or descriptiveness.13  In two instances, the 
Federal Circuit reversed or vacated TTAB orders due to the TTAB’s 
misapplication of its own procedural rules.14  Additionally, the 
Federal Circuit dismissed three appeals before they were heard 
because the appellant or the appellant’s counsel failed to follow the 
Federal Circuit’s procedural rules.15  In one instance, upon request of 
the Board, the Federal Circuit vacated an appeal of an ex parte 
decision because the registration upon which the application denial 
                                                          
 9. In re Chippendales, 622 F.3d at 1348, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681; Green Edge, 
620 F.3d at 1290, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425; Mattel, 601 F.3d at 1389, 94 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315; In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d at 1344, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1257; Mary Queen, 360 F. App’x at 150. 
 10. Fred Beverages, 605 F.3d at 964, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958; In re Hyatt, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 26199, at *1.  
 11. Odom’s, 600 F.3d at 1344–45, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2030. 
 12. In re Sharp, No. 2010-1148, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 
13, 2010) (per curiam) (without opinion); Bell’s Brewery, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
25499, at *1 (without opinion); Anthony’s Pizza, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23898, at *1–
10 (with opinion); In re The Lex Group VA, 383 F. App’x 949, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam) (without opinion); Mary Queen, 360 F. App’x at 150 (without opinion).  
 13. Only in Deere v. ITC, 605 F.3d 1350, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206 (Fed. Cir. 
2010), which was an appeal from a decision of the ITC regarding interpretation of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, did the Federal Circuit vacate and remand on a substantive 
trademark law issue.  Id. at 1361–62, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.    
 14. Fred Beverages, 605 F.3d at 967, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958 (reversed and 
remanded); Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., 367 F. App’x 161, 163 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam) (vacated). 
 15. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2010-1422, 2010 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 26870 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2010) (dismissed for failure to file timely appeal 
brief); In re Achenbach Buschhutten GmbH, No. 2010-1192, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
12248, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2010) (dismissed for counsel’s failure to become a 
member of the bar); Stoller v. Best Data Prods., Inc., No. 2010-1031, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 4354, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2010) (dismissed for failure to pay docketing 
fee). 
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was based was cancelled just days before the oral argument on the 
appeal.16 
Each of the Federal Circuit’s 2010 trademark decisions is discussed 
in detail below.  In a few instances, the opinions involve both 
noteworthy substantive and procedural determinations.17  In such 
cases, both the substantive and procedural issues are discussed 
together in Part I, Substantive Trademark Issues.  In the interest of 
brevity, facts and issues unrelated to trademark law are omitted from 
the case discussions.  
I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES 
A. Likelihood of Confusion 
1. University of South Carolina v. University of Southern California 
In University of South Carolina v. University of Southern California,18 the 
Federal Circuit upheld the TTAB’s decision to sustain Southern 
California’s opposition to South Carolina’s trademark application for 
a stylized SC mark, given the likelihood of confusion with Southern 
California’s prior SC registration.19  Further, the court upheld the 
TTAB’s dismissal of South Carolina’s cancellation counterclaim, 
which alleged that Southern California’s use of “SC” created a false 
connection with the state of South Carolina.20  However, the court 
disagreed with the TTAB’s lack of standing determination, and 
                                                          
 16. In re Hyatt, No. 2009-1229, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26199, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 
7, 2010). 
 17. In re Sharp, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356, at *1 (affirming the TTAB’s review 
of both the refusal of registration on the grounds that the applicant’s mark was 
merely descriptive of the applicant’s services—the procedural issue—and that the 
mark’s name was generic—the substantive issue); Odom’s Tenn. Pride Sausage, Inc. 
v. FF Acquisition, L.L.C., 600 F.3d 1343, 1346–47, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2030, 2030 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding both that the TTAB was not required to consider 
unregistered marks in its “likelihood of confusion” analysis—the procedural issue—
and that a single “likelihood of confusion” factor may be dispositive when that factor 
is the dissimilarity of the marks at issue—the substantive issue); Campbell v. Bassani 
Mfg., 368 F. App’x 133, 134–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (addressing the propriety of 
evaluating use by competitors in determining whether a mark is generic—the 
procedural issue—and whether the TTAB correctly granted summary judgment 
against the applicant—the substantive issue); Univ. of S.C. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 367 F. 
App’x 129, 132, 135 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 387 (2010) (addressing the 
TTAB’s grant of summary judgment against South Carolina on South Carolina’s 
counterclaim—the procedural issue—and the TTAB’s refusal to register South 
Carolina’s mark based on a likelihood of confusion—the substantive issue).  
 18. 367 F. App’x 129 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 387 (2010).  This opinion 
also involves a false connection counterclaim and a related standing issue.  Id. 
 19. Id. at 134–35.   
 20. Id. at 131, 135–37. 
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when purchasing the goods, and the absence of evidence of actual 
confusion.25   
With regard to the trade channels, Southern California had limited 
its goods identification in International Class 25 to include only 
“university authorized” goods.26  The Federal Circuit agreed with the 
TTAB that this included “any trade channels which are or could be 
authorized or approved by [Southern] California.”27  Thus, the 
Federal Circuit found no error in the TTAB’s conclusion that South 
Carolina’s goods would appear in the same trade channels as 
Southern California’s.28   
With respect to the care exercised by consumers, the Federal 
Circuit agreed with South Carolina that the TTAB’s conclusions 
regarding a lower level of care exercised by gift-purchasers and “new 
or casual fans” rested on speculation, rather than substantial 
evidence.29  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that even if the 
TTAB erred on this point, it was a harmless error that would not 
warrant reversal of the Board’s decision on likelihood of confusion.30   
Turning to the lack of actual confusion factor, the Federal Circuit 
held that, being presented with no evidence that the parties’ marks 
“appeared together for a significant length of time,” the TTAB had 
properly given little weight to the absence of evidence of actual 
confusion.31   
                                                          
factors are:  1) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to 
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression; 2) the similarity or 
dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or 
registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use; 3) the similarity or 
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels; 4) the conditions under 
which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated 
purchasing; 5) the fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use); 6) the 
number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods; 7) the nature and 
extent of any actual confusion; 8) the length of time during and conditions under 
which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; 9) the 
variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, “family” mark, 
product mark); 10) the market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior 
mark:  a) a mere “consent” to register or use, b) agreement provisions designed to 
preclude confusion, i.e. limitations on continued use of the marks by each party, c) 
assignment of mark, application, registration and good will of the related business, 
or d) laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative of lack 
of confusion; 11) the extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from 
use of its mark on its goods; 12) the extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de 
minimis or substantial; and 13) any other established fact probative of the effect of 
use.  In re DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.   
 25. Univ. of S.C., 367 F. App’x at 132. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 132–33 (quoting Univ. of S. Cal. v. Univ. of S.C., No. 91125615, 2008 
WL 3333839, at *8 (T.T.A.B. 2008)). 
 28. Id. at 133. 
 29. Id. at 133–34. 
 30. Id. at 134.   
 31. Id. at 135. 
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The Federal Circuit’s ruling regarding standing on South 
Carolina’s cancellation counterclaim is perhaps the more notable 
part of this case.  South Carolina’s counterclaim was based on Section 
2(a) of the Lanham Act,32 alleging that Southern California’s use of 
“SC” created a false connection with the state of South Carolina.33  
The TTAB granted summary judgment to Southern California on the 
counterclaim because it believed that the University of South 
Carolina was not an agency of the State of South Carolina, and thus, 
that the University of South Carolina lacked standing to assert a 
Section 2(a) claim based on a false association between the University 
of Southern California and the State of South Carolina.34  The 
Federal Circuit rejected the TTAB’s reasoning, without deciding 
whether the University of South Carolina was an agent of the state, 
and held that in order to establish standing South Carolina only 
needed to show:  1) that it had a reasonable belief that it would be 
damaged by Southern California’s registration and 2) that it had a 
direct and personal stake in the cancellation of that registration.35  
The Federal Circuit concluded that South Carolina did, in fact, 
establish standing.36 
Nevertheless, the court affirmed the TTAB’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Southern California on this issue because, in 
order to prevail, South Carolina needed to show that there was a 
genuine issue for trial on whether the initials “SC” “point uniquely” 
to the State of South Carolina.37  In the context of another issue, 
South Carolina itself had submitted evidence that “at least sixteen 
other universities and colleges represent themselves as ‘SC.’”38  In 
light of this evidence, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that 
South Carolina’s counterclaim could not survive summary 
judgment.39 
2. In re Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc.  
In In re Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc.,40 the Federal Circuit affirmed, in an 
unpublished, per curiam opinion, the TTAB’s ruling that consumer 
confusion is likely between the applicant’s MI PUEBLO (and Design) 
                                                          
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). 
 33. Univ. of S.C., 367 F. App’x at 131. 
 34. See id. at 136 (summarizing and affirming the TTAB’s grant of summary 
judgment against South Carolina on its cancellation counterclaim). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (citing Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., 703 
F.2d 1372, 1377, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 505, 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 38. Id. at 136.  
 39. Id. 
 40. 367 Fed. App’x 144 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
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In comparing the marks, the TTAB found the “ML” designation to 
be the dominant portion of both marks, and thereby dismissed 
Mighty Leaf Tea’s argument that the marks differ in appearance so 
much that there would be no likelihood of confusion.65  The Federal 
Circuit agreed with the TTAB on this conclusion and affirmed.66   
Mighty Leaf Tea’s arguments to the TTAB and to the Federal 
Circuit focused on the sixth DuPont factor:  “‘[t]he number and 
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.’”67  Mighty Leaf Tea 
argued that its evidence of third-party use of the “ML” mark shows 
that “ML” is a weak mark, and thus, that even minor variations of the 
cited registration should be registrable.68  It argued to the Federal 
Circuit that the TTAB had improperly focused on only the cited 
registered mark, without giving proper weight to third-party 
evidence.69  
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that third-party registrations 
may be given some weight in showing how third parties are using 
similar marks on similar goods, but the court rejected Mighty Leaf 
Tea’s contention that it had made an adequate showing of common 
elements so as to render consumer confusion unlikely.70  Specifically, 
the court cited the TTAB’s skeptical view of registrations containing 
two letter strings “ML” within longer words or strings, such as 
MLUXE, M’LIS, JML, and AMLAVI.71  The court agreed that such 
registrations did not act as evidence that “ML” had any recognized 
meaning or significance within the longer strings.72   
5. Outdoor Kids, Inc. v. Parris Manufacturing Co. 
In Outdoor Kids, Inc. v. Parris Manufacturing Co.,73 the Federal 
Circuit agreed with the TTAB’s conclusion that customer confusion 
was not likely between the trademarks KID’S OUTDOORS (and 
Design), and OUTDOORS KIDS (word mark) for three reasons:  
because the OUTDOORS KIDS mark was weak, the word portion of 
the KID’S OUTDOORS (and Design) mark was descriptive, and the 
transposition of the words in the respective marks and the presence 
of an elk design element in the registered marks were sufficient to 
                                                          
 65. Id. at 1347–48, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258, 1260–61. 
 66. Id. at 1348, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
 67. Id. at 1346, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259 (quoting In re E. I. DuPont 
DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 
1973)).  
 68. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 69. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 70. Id. at 1346–48, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259–60. 
 71. Id. at 1347, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.   
 72. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
 73. 385 F. App’x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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distinguish the marks.74  As a result, the Federal Circuit upheld the 
Board’s dismissal of the cancellation proceedings brought by 
Outdoor Kids.75 
Outdoor Kids obtained a registration for the word mark 
OUTDOOR KIDS in connection with various types of outdoor 
clothing and sporting goods for children.76  The registration included 
a disclaimer of rights in the term “KIDS” apart from the mark as a 
whole.77  Subsequently, Parris obtained two registrations for the 
following mark78:   
 
 
The goods listed in the Parris registrations were various types of 
clothing and toys.79   
Outdoor Kids petitioned the TTAB to cancel both of the Parris 
registrations based on a likelihood of confusion with Outdoor Kids’ 
prior existing registration.80  The TTAB found that the OUTDOOR 
KIDS mark was weak and was not famous, placing special emphasis 
on the fact that the mark was registered under a claim of acquired 
distinctiveness with a disclaimer of the term “KIDS”.81  The TTAB 
discussed several relevant DuPont factors, finding that while some 
factors favored a finding of a likelihood of confusion, the differences 
between the marks and the weakness of the word portions of the 
marks ultimately rendered customer confusion unlikely.82  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision in all respects.83   
This case is notable because courts generally accord greater weight 
to the words in a mark than the design features when they analyze a 
likelihood of confusion claim; this case demonstrates that where, as 
                                                          
 74. Id. at 994–96. 
 75. Id. at 996. 
 76. Id. at 993. 
 77. Id. at 994. 
 78. Id. at 993. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 993–94. 
 81. Id. at 994. 
 82. Id. at 994–96. 
 83. Id. at 996. 
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here, the words are highly descriptive or suggestive, the design may 
be more significant than the wording.84  The TTAB considered the 
elk design element to be a distinguishing feature between the marks, 
and the Federal Circuit found no error in that conclusion.85  Specific 
examples of likelihood of confusion cases that find a design more 
significant than wording are few and far between,86 but this case 
shows that the TTAB and the Federal Circuit are willing to recognize 
the power that a design feature may have in militating against finding 
a likelihood of confusion.  
6. Anthony’s Pizza Holding Co. v. Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta 
International, Inc. 
In Anthony’s Pizza Holding Co. v. Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta 
International, Inc.,87 the Federal Circuit affirmed, in an unpublished, 
per curiam opinion, the TTAB’s ruling, in a consolidated 
proceeding, to sustain an opposition and grant a petition to cancel 
after holding that ANTHONY’S PIZZA & PASTA is likely to be 
confused with ANTHONY’S COAL-FIRED PIZZA.88   
Appellant Anthony’s Pizza Holding (“APH”) obtained a 
registration for ANTHONY’S COAL-FIRED PIZZA in standard 
character form, and sought to register the same mark with the 
following design element both for restaurant services.89   
Appellee Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta (“APPI”) previously used and 
registered ANTHONY’S PIZZA & PASTA, also for restaurant 
services.90  In seeking to cancel the standard character word mark and 
                                                          
 84. See id. at 994 (finding that where the word portion of Parris’ mark is 
descriptive, the transposition of the words and the presence of the elk design were 
sufficient to distinguish the two marks).   
 85. Id.  
 86. See, e.g., Parfums de Coeur, Ltd. v. Lazarus, No. 91161331, 2007 WL 683784, 
at *1, *4, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1012, 1016 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (holding that in a 
particular instance, the design element of the BODYMAN mark was very noticeable 
and eye-catching, and therefore more dominant than the word element of the 
mark). 
 87. No. 2010-1191, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23898 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2010) (per 
curiam). 
 88. Id. at *1. 
 89. Id. at *1–2. 
 90. Id.  
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to oppose the application for ANTHONY’S COAL-FIRED PIZZA (and 
Design), appellee APPI argued that a likelihood of confusion existed 
and that APPI, having used its mark for restaurant services for more 
than twenty-three years, had priority.91  The TTAB and the Federal 
Circuit agreed.92   
The appellant first challenged the TTAB’s focus on certain factors 
and its finding of likelihood of confusion.93  While the TTAB 
considered all the DuPont factors for which there was record 
evidence, it focused on the factors it considered dispositive, namely 
similarity of the marks and relatedness of the services.94  Noting the 
TTAB’s finding that the parties’ services are legally identical, the 
Federal Circuit found that “‘[w]hen marks would appear on virtually 
identical goods or services, the degree of similarity necessary to 
support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.’”95 
Reviewing the TTAB’s analysis of the similarity of the marks, the 
Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the TTAB’s 
finding that the marks were similar.96  Specifically, the court noted 
that the TTAB found that “ANTHONY’S” was the dominant portion 
of each mark and that consumers were likely to shorten both marks 
to “Anthony’s” or “Anthony’s Pizza,” particularly in light of the 
weaker, descriptive remaining terms in the marks.97  Additionally, the 
TTAB found that the design element in the composite mark was 
comprised of the letter “A” and that the primary commercial 
impression engendered thereby remains the name “Anthony’s.”98  
The TTAB also found that the flames in the design element and the 
phrase “COAL-FIRED PIZZA” were so much smaller than the word 
“ANTHONY’S” that they had little or no source-indicating 
significance and should be given less weight.99  The Federal Circuit 
held that the TTAB did not improperly dissect the marks and 
“properly analyzed the marks in their entireties, while appropriately 
focusing on the dominant element.”100   
The appellant also argued that APPI failed to police its mark.101  
The Federal Circuit held that the record did not show a reticence on 
                                                          
 91. Id. at *2. 
 92. Id. at *1, *10. 
 93. Id. at *3. 
 94. Id. at *4. 
 95. Id. at *4–5 (quoting Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 
F.2d 874, 877, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citations omitted)). 
 96. Id. at *6. 
 97. Id. at *5. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at *6. 
 101. Id. at *7–8. 
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the appellee’s part to protect its mark.102  In so holding, the court 
considered evidence of the APPI’s watch service and the fact that no 
evidence disclosed a confusingly similar mark to APPI’s mark either 
registered with the Trademark Office or used in an overlapping 
geographic area.  The court also noted the fact that APPI took efforts 
to minimize potential confusion with a third party by participating in 
a co-existence agreement with the owner of the ANTHONY’S PIZZA 
THE WORLD’S GREATEST mark, which established distinct trade 
channels between the two.103 
The Federal Circuit found the TTAB’s determination to be 
precisely consistent with the intent of the Lanham Act, which is to 
prevent registration of marks likely to cause confusion.104  This 
decision is consistent with an abundance of case law holding that the 
more related the goods and services, the less the degree of similarity 
of the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. 
B. Inherent Distinctiveness/Acquired Distinctiveness of Trade Dress 
In both inherent distinctiveness decisions issued by the Federal 
Circuit this year, it affirmed the test and governing law as stated in 
Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd.105  Both cases below illustrate 
that an applicant’s trade dress will not be deemed inherently 
distinctive if the elements of the trade dress are either common 
shapes or designs, usual in the relevant field, or if the trade dress 
consists of a mere refinement of an existing form or ornamentation 
for the particular class of goods or services. 
1. Foundation for a Christian Civilization, Inc. v. Mary Queen of the 
Third Millenium, Inc. 
Foundation for a Christian Civilization, Inc. v. Mary Queen of the Third 
Millenium, Inc.106 is an unpublished per curiam decision without 
opinion affirming the TTAB’s judgment in favor of the opposer.107  In 
this atypical trademark dispute, after five and one-half years of 
contentious opposition between two formerly aligned religious 
groups, both claiming a desire to use the contested trade dress, the 
TTAB found, in a non-precedential decision, that the applicant’s 
trade dress: 
 
                                                          
 102. Id. at *7–8. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at *10. 
 105. 568 F.2d 1342, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 106. 360 F. App’x 150 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 107. Id. 
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was incapable of distinguishing its goods and services.108   
The trade dress consisted of the design of a ceremonial religious 
habit:  a scapular containing a cross centered on the front and a 
hood in the back, worn atop a habit with a metal and beaded belt 
(the “Habit”).109  The applicant sought to register the Habit for 
“clothing, namely ceremonial habit worn by distinguished religious 
representatives in certain ceremonies” and “promoting public 
awareness of the need for healthy and religious families in the United 
States.”110 
The TTAB first examined whether the opposer had standing to 
oppose the registration of the trade dress on grounds that the 
applicant’s mark lacked distinctiveness.111  “To have standing to assert 
a ground that a mark lacks distinctiveness opposer must have a 
present or prospective right to use the same or similar ‘mark’ in its 
‘business.’”112  While the opposer had not used the Habit, the TTAB 
held that such use is not required and found that the opposer had a 
sufficient interest in the mark to support a finding of standing.113  
Additionally, the TTAB found that the opposer was, in effect, a 
competitor of the applicant because the opposer—an organization 
akin to a religious trade association—represented the legal interests 
of and was affiliated with the group that actually used the Habit.114 
During examination of the application, the applicant was required 
to establish acquired distinctiveness with respect to the identified 
                                                          
 108. Mary Queen of the Third Millenium, Inc. v. Found. for a Christian 
Civilization, Inc., No. 91157073, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 157 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2009). 
 109. Id. at *1–2. 
 110. Id. at *1. 
 111. Id. at *22. 
 112. Id. at *24 (citing Plyboo Am., Inc. v. Smith & Fong Co., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1633 (T.T.A.B. 1999)). 
 113. Id. at *25–26. 
 114. Id. at *25. 
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goods.115  No similar requirement was made with respect to the 
applied-for services, and the Examining Attorney found that the 
Habit was inherently distinctive with respect to those services.116  The 
Examining Attorney accepted a declaration submitted by the 
applicant claiming substantially exclusive and continuous use of the 
Habit on clothing since 1978 and passed the mark on for publication 
with respect to all goods and services listed in the application.117   
In arguing that the Habit was not distinctive of the applicant’s 
goods and services, the opposer first argued that the applicant was 
aware at the time of filing that the opposer’s members had appeared 
publically wearing the Habit.118  The opposer also argued that prior to 
the opposer’s and the applicant’s schism, the Habit had only been 
used and perceived as a symbol of dedication to a life of sanctity, that 
use of the Habit in religious celebrations far outweighed public use 
by the applicant after the parties’ schism; therefore, the Habit had 
not acquired distinctiveness.119   
The TTAB, in finding that the Habit lacked inherent 
distinctiveness, analyzed the distinctiveness question regarding the 
applied-for goods and services separately.  First, the TTAB considered 
whether the Habit was inherently distinctive with respect to the 
applied-for services.120  After finding that the Habit was a form of 
trade dress that could be inherently distinctive, the TTAB focused on 
“whether or not it is reasonable to assume that the consumer is 
predisposed to view the trade dress as a source indicator.”121   
The TTAB applied the relevant Seabrook122 factors:  1) “[w]hether 
the Habit is a common basic shape or design;” 2) “[w]hether the 
Habit is unique or unusual in the particular field;” and 3) “[w]hether 
the Habit is a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-
known form or ornamentation for a particular class of goods or 
services.”123  The TTAB refined these factors to the single question, 
“‘whether the design, shape or combination of elements is so unique, 
unusual or unexpected in this market that one can assume without 
proof that it will automatically be perceived by customers as an 
                                                          
 115. Id. at *26. 
 116. Id. at *26–27. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at *27. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at *29. 
 121. Id. at *32.   
 122. Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 196 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 289 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 123. Mary Queen, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 157, at *29–30. 
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indicia of origin—a trademark.’”124  Holding that the Habit was not 
inherently distinctive, the TTAB found the elements of the Habit 
“[un]surprising,” “far from novel,” “conventional,” and “prosaic,” 
such that the Habit could not be assumed to stand out and be 
perceived as a single source indicator without proof of the same.125  
Instead, the TTAB found that the Habit fell within the “general realm 
of habits worn by other religious groups.”126   
In finding that the applicant had not submitted sufficient evidence 
to demonstrate acquired distinctiveness for either the applied-for 
goods or services, the TTAB noted that because the trade dress of the 
Habit was relatively ordinary, the applicant bore a heavy burden to 
prove acquired distinctiveness.127  Furthermore, it stated that due to 
the atypical nature of the proceeding, the types of evidence 
commonly used to demonstrate acquired distinctiveness—such as 
sales and advertising figures, promotional efforts, product/service 
popularity, brand awareness numbers, and market share—were not 
present.128   
Considering the evidence as of the time of registrability (i.e., 
through the trial period)129 the TTAB discussed the amount and 
nature of the demonstrated uses of the Habit, such as at weekly 
meetings by approximately fourteen members, some public events, 
parades and appearances, and in some media coverage.130  Ultimately, 
the TTAB found that the uses were “relatively minor” and fell “far 
short of establishing acquired distinctiveness of the mark sought to be 
registered.”131  In parsing the evidence of events where the Habit was 
displayed, the TTAB repeatedly noted as significant the small number 
of attendees in total (typically less than one hundred), the small 
number of attendees wearing the Habit (typically less than two 
dozen), and, in particular, the small number of non-member 
attendees (typically less than thirty).132   
Overall, the TTAB found the applicant’s evidence lacking 
regarding exposure of the Habit to members of the public and held 
that the “mere wearing of the Habit, mostly in private situations, does 
not magically transform the Habit into a source indicator for 
                                                          
 124. Id. at *33 (quoting J. T. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 8.02[4] (3d ed. 1993)). 
 125. Id. at *34. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at *38. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at *40–41 (citing Gen. Foods Corp. v. MGD Partners, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
479, 486 (T.T.A.B. 1984)). 
 130. Id. at *41–42. 
 131. Id. at *43. 
 132. Id. at *42–47. 
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applicant’s goods and services.”133  Finally, the TTAB also found that 
the opposer’s evidence establishing its own, more significant, public 
use of the Habit rebutted the applicant’s contention of the requisite 
substantially exclusive use.134  This finding further acted to defeat the 
applicant’s claim of acquired distinctiveness.135 
2. In re Chippendales USA, Inc. 
In In re Chippendales USA, Inc.,136 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
TTAB’s denial after an ex parte appeal of the applicant’s application 
for the Chippendales uniform trade dress, consisting of cuffs and a 
bow tie (the “Cuffs & Collar trade dress”), holding that the trade 
dress was not inherently distinctive.137   
At the start of the proceedings, Chippendales already held an 
incontestable registration for the Cuffs & Collar trade dress on the 
basis of acquired distinctiveness.138  After receiving a waiver of the 
typical bar from registering the same mark for the same goods and 
services, Chippendales proceeded with the instant application solely 
in order to resolve the underlying substantive issue:  whether the 
Cuffs & Collar trade dress was inherently distinctive.139  
Stripping the Federal Circuit’s determination down to the bare 
essentials, the TTAB and the Federal Circuit determined that the 
trade dress was not inherently distinctive at the time Chippendales 
sought to register the trade dress,140 given that the prior use and 
registrations for adult female costumes consisted of cuffs and a bow 
                                                          
 133. Id. at *47–48. 
 134. Id. at *50–51. 
 135. Id.  
 136. 622 F.3d 1346, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 137. Id. at 1358, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689. 
 138. Id. at 1349, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 139. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 140. As acknowledged in the TTAB’s opinion, the Federal Circuit held that the 
appropriate time for measuring inherent distinctiveness is at the time of registration, 
not at the time of first use of the mark.  Id. at 1354–55, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1686–87. 
2011] 2010 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS 1179 
tie and that the relevant market was adult entertainment, not 
specifically adult entertainment for women.141   
As they did in Mary Queen,142 both the TTAB and the Federal 
Circuit applied the Seabrook factors in reaching their respective 
decisions.143  The Federal Circuit held that the issue of inherent 
distinctiveness is a factual determination to be made by the TTAB, 
and that “[i]f a mark satisfies any of the first three [Seabrook factors], 
it is not inherently distinctive.”144   
Here, the Federal Circuit agreed with the TTAB’s conclusion that 
the third Seabrook factor prevented the Cuffs & Collar trade dress 
from being deemed inherently distinctive.145  Citing Chippendales’ 
inspiration for its trade dress from the pervasive and “ubiquitous 
Playboy bunny suit, which included cuffs, a collar and bowtie, a 
corset, and a set of bunny ears,”146 which had been used for two 
decades prior to Chippendales’ introduction of its Cuffs & Collar 
trade dress, the TTAB and Federal Circuit concluded that the Cuffs & 
Collar trade dress was merely “a refinement of an existing form of 
ornamentation for the particular class of services.”147  As such, 
Chippendales’ trade dress was not of such a design that a consumer 
would immediately rely on it to differentiate the services from those 
of competitors, or as a single source identifier.148 
C. Genericness 
1. Campbell v. Bassani Manufacturing  
As with In re Achenbach Buschhutten GmbH,149 the outcome of 
Campbell v. Bassani Manufacturing150 highlighted the need to strictly 
adhere to rules and required procedure.  In Campbell, the pro se 
trademark applicant’s evidence of non-genericness was rejected after 
                                                          
 141. Id. at 1355–57, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687–89. 
 142. See supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of Mary Queen. 
 143. In re Chippendales, 622 F.3d at 1351–52, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684–85. 
 144. Id. at 1350–51, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 145. Id. at 1356–57, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688. 
 146. Id. at 1350, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (citing In re Chippendales USA, 
Inc., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1535, 1546 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2009)). 
 147. Id. at 1350, 1356–57, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (citing In re Chippendales, 
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542). 
 148. Id. at 1352, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685. 
 149. No. 2010-1192, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12248 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2010).  See infra 
Part II.F.2 for a further discussion of In re Achenbach. 
 150. 368 F. App’x 133 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied, No. 2009-1534, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9432 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2010) (per curiam).  This opinion also involves a 
procedural issue, namely, the effect of improper submission of evidence before the 
Board. 
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he failed to follow the proper procedure for authenticating 
evidence.151 
In this case, the applicant “filed an application to register the mark 
X-PIPE for ‘internal combustion engine exhausts.’”152  Bassani 
opposed the registration, arguing, inter alia, that X-PIPE is generic.153  
Bassani submitted evidence of genericness, including printouts of 
magazine articles, newspaper articles, online publications, website 
printouts, copies of catalogs, and a declaration of a competitor of 
Campbell.154  Campbell submitted evidence in response, but the 
Board rejected Campbell’s evidence as inadmissible under 
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE 
section 528.05(e) because the evidence was not accompanied by an 
authenticating affidavit or declaration.155  Bassani prevailed on 
summary judgment and Campbell’s motion for reconsideration was 
denied.156  Campbell appealed to the Federal Circuit.157   
In affirming the Board, the Federal Circuit framed the genericness 
test as follows:  “[t]o determine whether a term is generic, we identify 
the genus of goods or services at issue and ask whether the term is 
‘understood by the relevant public primarily to refer to that genus of 
goods or services.’”158  The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s 
conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the relevant public primarily understood X-PIPE to refer to 
“internal combustion engine exhausts which contain exhaust pipes 
and discharge pipes.”159   
Along the way, the Federal Circuit rejected Campbell’s argument 
that separate references by the Board to the genus as “exhaust pipes 
and discharge pipes” in one instance, and as “internal combustion 
engine exhausts” in another instance, created inconsistency which 
would render the Board’s decision reversible.160  The Federal Circuit 
also rejected Campbell’s argument that it was improper for the Board 
to rely upon case law not cited by the parties.161   
While it is not clear that the outcome of this case would have been 
different if Campbell had followed the procedural rules, it is clear 
                                                          
 151. Id. at 133–35. 
 152. Id. at 133. 
 153. Id. at 133–34. 
 154. Id. at 134. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. (quoting In re 1800Mattress.com IP, L.L.C., 586 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2009)). 
 159. Id. (quotation omitted). 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 135. 
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that the trademark applicant had no leg to stand on given his failure 
to authenticate his evidence.  Pro se trademark applicants beware:  the 
rules apply equally to you.   
2. In re Sharp  
In In re Sharp,162 the Federal Circuit affirmed, per curiam, and 
without opinion,163 the TTAB’s non-precedential decision in an ex 
parte appeal that denied registration of the mark PHONECASTING 
on the Supplemental Registry because it was generic.164  The mark 
PHONECASTING referred to “wireless communications services, 
specifically, the transmission of multimedia content to mobile 
telephones and wireless communications devices via the Internet.”165  
The Board’s discussion of genericism and the evidence presented by 
the Examining Attorney provide useful guidelines regarding the types 
of evidence sufficient to support a finding of genericism and why the 
PHONECASTING application was denied pursuant to Section 23 of 
the Lanham Act.166  In affirming the Examining Attorney’s finding 
that the mark was generic, the Board first found that there was “a 
distinct genre or type of wireless communication services conducted 
specifically by telephone,” and further found that the Examining 
Attorney accurately described the category of services at issue as 
“wireless communication services.”167   
In the remainder of the opinion, the Board discussed the plethora 
of evidence submitted by the Trademark Office that demonstrated 
how the relevant consumers perceived the term “phonecasting.”168  
The evidence included patent applications bearing the term in the 
title and explaining the invention in accordance with the services 
listed in the applicant’s application, dictionary and Wikipedia entries 
                                                          
 162. No. 2010-1148, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2010) 
(per curiam).  This opinion also involves a procedural issue regarding objections to 
arguments and evidence presented by the Examining Attorney in an ex parte appeal.  
Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. In re Sharp, No. 78765022, 2009 WL 4085613, at *4 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2009).  
During the ex parte appeal to the TTAB, the applicant raised a procedural issue, 
objecting to the basis of the Trademark Office’s final refusal and its submission of 
evidence to the Board in support of the refusal.  Id. at *1–3.  Specifically, the 
applicant argued that the Examining Attorney improperly sought to change the basis 
of the final refusal from descriptive to genericism; however, the Board rejected the 
applicant’s argument in light of the Trademark Office’s mandate to register only 
eligible marks and because it found the Examining Attorney’s citation to a wrong 
rule inconsequential given that the Examining Attorney accurately explained her 
position.  Id. 
 165. Id. at *4. 
 166. Id. at *3–6; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a)–(c) (2006) (explaining the 
registration process for the Supplemental Registry). 
 167. In re Sharp, 2009 WL 4085613, at *4. 
 168. Id. at *4–6. 
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for the term, news articles discussing the term, numerous websites 
and blogs referencing the term in connection with the services as 
applied for by the applicant, and press releases from entities 
launching “phonecasting service[s]” and applications.169  After 
considering all of the above, the Board found that “the primary 
significance of the term ‘phonecasting’ as applied to wireless 
communications services is a generic or common name.”170 
D. Descriptiveness 
1. In re The Lex Group VA  
In In re The Lex Group VA,171 an unpublished per curiam judgment 
without opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s non-
precedential decision to affirm the Examining Attorney’s refusal to 
register the mark E-LEX as merely descriptive of the applicant’s 
services, pursuant to Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act.172  The 
applicant sought to register E-LEX for “litigation support services for 
attorneys provided via an electronic network with court-specific 
consultation on the rules and implementation of procedures for 
filing electronically.”173  In finding the mark descriptive, both the 
Examining Attorney and the Board cited four dictionary definitions 
in which “lex” means “law”, and the Board took judicial notice of the 
definition.174  The Examining Attorney and the Board also cited 
numerous dictionary definitions, other references, and cases in which 
the term “e” was found to be “a term that simply describes the fact 
that the goods or services are associated with the internet,” or that 
they are electronic in nature.175  Finally, the Board noted that “the 
addition of the hyphen is not significant” and that the combination 
of the two terms does not have any unique meaning “that would be 
different from the individual terms.”176 
2. ERBE Elektronedizin GmbH v. Canady Technology L.L.C. 
In the only color mark decision issued in 2010, ERBE Elektronedizin 
GmbH v. Canady Technology L.L.C.,177 the Federal Circuit affirmed both 
                                                          
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at *6. 
 171. 383 F. App’x 949 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 172. Id. (affirming In re Lex Group VA, No. 76665046, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 534 
(T.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2009)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2006) (not permitting 
registration of a trademark if it is “merely descriptive”).   
 173. In re Lex Group, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 534, at *7. 
 174. Id. at *2, *4–5. 
 175. Id. at *4–7. 
 176. Id. at *6,*8. 
 177. 629 F.3d 1278, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  
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the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Canady 
dismissing ERBE’s trademark and trade dress infringement claims 
and the district court’s finding that ERBE’s blue color mark and 
trade dress were not protectable.178   
ERBE based its trademark infringement claims on a registration 
from the Supplemental Register for the color blue for surgical 
endoscopic probes and common law rights in trade dress consisting 
of a blue tube with black markings at the end of the probe.179  The 
Examining Attorney denied ERBE’s application to register the color 
mark on the Principal Register after determining that the color blue 
on probes was ornamental and that ERBE failed to show evidence of 
secondary meaning, of whether competitors used the color for their 
products, and of whether the color was functional.180 
Asserting a mark registered only on the Supplemental Register, 
ERBE bore the burden of proving that it owned a valid mark.181  
Specifically, in order to survive summary judgment, ERBE would have 
had to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the color blue 
was non-functional and had acquired secondary meaning in 
connection with endoscopic probes.182  With respect to functionality, 
a “[c]olor may not be granted trademark protection if the color 
performs a utilitarian function in connection with the goods it 
identifies or there are specific competitive advantages for use.”183  The 
evidence in the record demonstrated that the color blue was 
prevalent in the medical field and that blue was specifically used by 
companies in the field on endoscopic probes because the color 
enhances identification of the endoscopic tip.184  Consequently, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court properly found the 
                                                          
 178. Id. at 1280, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050. 
 179. Id. at 1282, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051. 
 180. Id. at 1287, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055–56.  In dissenting, Judge Newman 
challenged the majority’s recitation and application of trademark law regarding 
functionality, stating that the fact that ERBE was granted a registration in the 
Supplemental Register established in and of itself a genuine issue as to the question, 
given that the Trademark Office’s Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure 
dictates that functional marks are not registrable on either the Principal or 
Supplemental Registers.  See id. at 1294, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060 (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (citing TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1202.05(b) (7th 
ed. 2010)).  Judge Newman also criticized the majority’s and the district court’s 
evaluations and determinations of factual issues, arguing that genuine issues of fact 
existed both with respect to functionality and secondary meaning.  Id. at 1294–96, 97 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060–61 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 181. Id. at 1288, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056. 
 182. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056. 
 183. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull 
Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1530–33, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120, 1122–24 (Fed. Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995). 
 184. Id. at 1289, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057. 
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descriptive,” under Section 2(e)(2) of the Lanham Act192 is whether 
“the term in the mark sought to be registered is the name of a place 
known generally to the public” and that “the public would . . . believe 
that the goods or services for which the mark is sought to be 
registered originate in that place.”193  The Board makes the 
determination “in connection with the goods or services with which 
the mark is used and from the perspective of the relevant public for 
those goods.”194  While typically it may be presumed that there is a 
goods/place association if the goods do in fact emanate from the 
place named in the mark, an exception to that presumption exists if 
“‘the place named in the mark is so obscure or remote that 
purchasers would fail to recognize the term as indicating the 
geographical source of the goods.’”195 
The Board referred to several evidentiary points in finding the 
exception applicable and “Bell Hill” obscure, despite the fact that a 
road named Bell Hill existed near the applicant.196  Specifically, the 
Board found that the opposer failed to establish that Bell Hill 
designated a specific geographic region or location other than a local 
road, known at best only by locals; further, the Board found that the 
opposer’s handful of submitted marketing materials and menus 
referencing Bell Hill was insufficient.197  While the applicant 
submitted its own evidence from the Geographic Names Information 
Systems198 showing that no such geographic designation existed in its 
area, the Board rejected this evidence as not relevant and insufficient 
to create a genuine issue of material fact, reiterating that the opposer 
need only prove that the place is known generally to the public and 
that the public would make a goods/place association.199 
Once the Board determined that Bell Hill was remote, the 
opposer’s fraud claim also quickly fell.  Because the opposer did not 
prove the stringent fraud elements, the Board found that the 
applicant did not commit fraud when it represented to the 
                                                          
 192. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (2006).  
 193. See Bell’s Brewery, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 699, at *14 (citing In re Societe Generale 
des Eaux Minerales de Vittel S.A., 824 F.2d 957, 959, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450, 1452 
(Fed Cir. 1987)). 
 194. See id. at *15 (citing In re MCO Properties Inc., 1995 WL 838977, 38 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1154 (T.T.A.B. 1995)). 
 195. Id. at *14–15 (quoting Vittel, 824 F.2d at 959, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451). 
 196. Id. at *15–16. 
 197. Id. 
 198. The Geographic Names Information Systems database is maintained by the 
U.S. Board of Geographic Names, within the U.S. Geological Survey in the 
Department of the Interior.  Id. at *16. 
 199. Id. at *16 n.8. 
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Trademark Office that Bell Hill did not have a geographic 
significance.200 
Finally, in applying the DuPont factors, the Board concluded that 
there was no likelihood of confusion between the parties’ marks.201  
Of all the DuPont factors, the Board found that the dissimilarities of 
the marks carried the most weight here.202  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Board emphasized the dominance of BELL’S in the 
opposer’s mark, the fact that the applicant’s mark was a unitary 
phrase giving the impression of a place, and that the connotation and 
commercial impressions given off by both were sufficiently different 
to outweigh any similarities based upon the common element 
BELL.203 
F. Abandonment 
1. The Crash Dummy Movie, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. 
In Crash Dummy Movie, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,204 the appellant and 
applicant of the mark CRASH DUMMIES crashed and burned when 
the Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the TTAB.  The 
court affirmed the TTAB’s decision to sustain an opposition brought 
by Mattel based upon its marks CRASH DUMMIES and THE 
INCREDIBLE CRASH DUMMIES.205  The Federal Circuit found that 
substantial evidence existed to support the TTAB’s finding that 
Mattel had overcome the statutory presumption of abandonment of 
its marks and that “no doubt” existed that the appellant’s mark was 
likely to be confused with the appellee’s marks in light of the parties’ 
agreement that likelihood of confusion existed.206   
Mattel’s former owner ceased use of its marks in late 1995 or early 
1996.207  Mattel purchased the marks in 1997.208  Mattel recorded the 
assignment of the marks in 1998, but the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office cancelled the registrations in 2000 due to Mattel’s 
failure to submit Section 8 declarations of use.209  The TTAB and the 
Federal Circuit found that recordation of the trademark assignment 
in 1998, evidence of toy development from 2000 to 2003, and a first 
shipment of toys bearing the mark CRASH DUMMIES in December 
                                                          
 200. Id. at *18. 
 201. Id. at *5–13. 
 202. Id. at *13. 
 203. Id. at *12–13. 
 204. 601 F.3d 1387, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 205. Id. at 1389, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315. 
 206. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315. 
 207. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315–16. 
 208. Id. at 1390, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316. 
 209. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316. 
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2003 together constituted sufficient evidence to rebut the 
presumption that the marks had been abandoned.210   
On appeal, under the “substantial evidence standard,” the Federal 
Circuit must determine “whether a reasonable person might find that 
the evidentiary record supports the agency’s conclusion.”211  The 
TTAB found that Mattel showed “reasonable grounds for the 
suspension and plans to resume use in the reasonably foreseeable 
future when the conditions requiring suspension abate[d].”212  In 
upholding the TTAB’s conclusion, the Federal Circuit pointed to 
several specific facts.  First, it referenced the fact that the marks had 
not been abandoned before they were assigned to Mattel in 1997 and 
that the appellant did not challenge this issue.213  Second, as the 
Federal Circuit reiterated, a finding of abandonment requires not 
only a cessation of use, but also a finding of intent not to resume such 
use.214  In holding Mattel had not abandoned the marks, the Federal 
Circuit cited Mattel’s evidence that it intended to resume use of the 
marks, specifically, Mattel’s (i) discussions with a third-party retailer 
regarding an exclusive sales arrangement and retooling of the 
product line in 1998, (ii) the fact that Mattel recorded the trademark 
assignment in 1998, and (iii) the internal documents and testimony 
regarding research and development efforts from 2000 to 2003 to 
launch a new product line.215  Finally, the Federal Circuit also cited 
the shipment of toys bearing the mark at the end of 2003 as 
supportive of Mattel’s witness’ testimony regarding the planning and 
development of the new product line under the CRASH DUMMIES 
mark.216  The Federal Circuit also made it a point to note that 
“cancellation of a trademark registration does not necessarily 
translate into abandonment of common law trademark rights.  Nor 
does it establish an owner’s lack of intent to use a mark.”217 
G. “All or Substantially All” Gray Goods Infringement Test 
1. Deere & Co. v. ITC 
Deere & Co. v. ITC218 is the only 2010 trademark case that involved 
an appeal from the United States International Trade Commission 
(“ITC”).  The case involved a challenge to the ITC’s  application of 
                                                          
 210. Id. at 1391-92, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316–18. 
 211. Id. at 1390, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316. 
 212. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316. 
 213. Id. at 1391, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316–17. 
 214. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006)). 
 215. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317. 
 216. Id. at 1391–92, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317. 
 217. Id. at 1391, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.  
 218. 605 F.3d 1350, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.219  After review, the Federal 
Circuit vacated and remanded the ITC’s judgment denying Deere & 
Co. (“Deere”) an exclusion order after the ITC had determined that 
the sale of European versions of John Deere harvesters in the United 
States by third parties did not violate Section 337.220  The Federal 
Circuit held that the ITC improperly applied the “all or substantially 
all” test for finding trademark infringement based on gray market 
goods under the Tariff Act.221  Gray market goods are goods that are 
“produced by the owner of the United States trademark or with its 
consent, but [are] not authorized for sale in the United States.”222 
This was the second trip to the Federal Circuit for these litigants.  
In 2004, the ITC had granted a general exclusion order barring 
importation of European-version harvesters bearing Deere 
trademarks, gray market Deere harvesters, which Bourdeau Bros., 
Inc., a Deere dealer, appealed to the Federal Circuit.223  In that 
appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated in part and remanded the ITC’s 
decision, dictating that Deere show that “all or substantially all” of 
Deere’s authorized domestic products were materially different from 
the accused gray market goods.224  After remand, the ITC determined 
that not “all or substantially all” of the authorized harvesters sold in 
the United States were North American-version harvesters, thus 
concluding that Deere was not entitled to relief for a violation of 
Section 337 for gray market trademark infringement.  That ITC 
decision led to the instant appeal. 
Deere manufactured self-propelled forage harvesters for sale in 
Europe, but manufactured different forage harvesters for sale in the 
United States (the “North American harvester”).225  Both forage 
harvesters, however, were sold under Deere trademarks that were 
registered in the United States.226  Deere objected to the sale of the 
European version of the harvesters in the United States by various 
third parties, and Deere contended that such sales infringed Deere’s 
trademarks through gray market importation.227  Deere’s products 
were either sold by independent dealers who operated without 
                                                          
 219. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006) (providing a trade remedy against unfair import 
competition). 
 220. Deere, 605 F.3d at 1351, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.  
 221. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207. 
 222. Id. at 1352, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208. 
 223. Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 444 F.3d 1317, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1221 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 224. Id. at 1327, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1224.    
 225. Deere, 605 F.3d at 1352, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208. 
 226. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207. 
 227. Id. at 1351, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207. 
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oversight from Deere or official dealers who operated pursuant to a 
dealership agreement with Deere.228 
A trademark owner is entitled to recover for a violation of Section 
337 for gray market trademark infringement as long as all or 
substantially all of the trademark owner’s authorized sales in the 
United States are of the permitted, United States version of the 
product.229  The reasoning behind this rule is to prevent the 
inconsistency of allowing a trademark owner to argue that consumers 
will be confused by the sale of gray goods, while simultaneously 
allowing the trademark owner to sell goods other than its defined 
United States product.230   
The ITC refused to find gray market goods infringement or allow 
Deere to recover for a violation of Section 337 because the ITC 
calculated that as many as 40% to 57% of the European harvesters 
sold in the United States had been sold by “official” Deere dealers, 
and consequently, Deere itself was responsible for introducing the 
nonconforming goods into U.S. commerce.231   
On appeal, Deere first challenged which categories of European 
harvester sales were counted as “authorized” sales; however, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed each of the ITC’s decisions, finding that they 
were supported by substantial evidence.232  Of note, the ITC and the 
Federal Circuit held that apparent authority of official Deere 
dealers—defined as buyers’ reasonable belief based on the acts and 
omissions of Deere that sales were authorized—is sufficient for sales 
to be deemed authorized.233  The Federal Circuit also held that as 
long as a dealer was an “official” dealer, it did not matter whether the 
dealer that made the sale into the United States was located in 
Europe or the United States.234   
Second, Deere argued that regardless of the number of 
“authorized” sales of European harvesters, the ITC still misapplied 
the formula used to determine the “all or substantially all test.”235  The 
Federal Circuit agreed that the ITC misapplied the formula that the 
Federal Circuit itself had dictated be used in a prior decision in this 
matter.236  Instead of dividing the number of authorized European 
                                                          
 228. Id. at 1352, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207–08. 
 229. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208. 
 230. Id. at 1352–53, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208. 
 231. Id. at 1354–55, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209–10. 
 232. Id. at 1355–57, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210–11. 
 233. Id. at 1357, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211–12. 
 234. Id. at 1357–58, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212. 
 235. Id. at 1358–59, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213. 
 236. See id. at 1360, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214 (explaining the proper way to 
calculate the “all or substantially all” test in this case as requiring Deere to establish 
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the number of sales of European forage 
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harvesters sold in the United States (141) by the total number of 
authorized harvesters sold in the United States (both the North 
American and the European versions (between 4,541 and 4,555)), the 
ITC divided the number of authorized European harvesters sold in 
the United States (141) by only the total number of European 
harvester versions sold in the United States (between 247 and 347).237  
Thus, the true calculation of authorized sales totaled only 3.1% to 
3.4%, in stark contrast to the ITC’s calculation that 40% to 57% of 
the non-confirming, European harvesters sold in the United States 
were authorized.238   
While a prior decision by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit found that 4.4% of authorized gray goods sales 
was a small enough number to allow a trademark owner relief,239 the 
Federal Circuit remanded the case back to the ITC to determine 
whether 3.1% to 3.4% is an insubstantial percentage.  If deemed 
insubstantial, Deere would be entitled to relief under Section 337 of 
the Tariff Act, and the gray market harvesters (European-version 
harvesters) would be excluded from the United States.240 
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES241 
This year, the Federal Circuit rendered several decisions which 
made it clear that not only do litigants have trouble following rules, 
but that the TTAB also must pay them closer attention. 
                                                          
harvesters was so small that substantially all of Deere’s sales in the United States were 
of North American forage harvesters, such that substantially all of the authorized 
sales were of goods bearing the asserted material differences”). 
 237. Id. at 1359, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214–15. 
 238. Id. at 1360, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214–15. 
 239. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 7–8 (2d Cir. 
1996) (reversing the lower court’s denial of injunctive relief to trademark owner). 
 240. Deere, 605 F.3d at 1361, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215. 
 241. See supra Part I.  For additional procedural decisions, see, e.g., In re Sharp, No. 
2010-1148, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2010) (per curiam) 
(objections to arguments and evidence presented by the Examining Attorney in ex 
parte appeal); Odom’s Tenn. Pride Sausage v. FF Acquisition, L.L.C., 600 F.3d 1343, 
1346, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2030 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (effect of unpled claims); 
Campbell v. Bassani Mfg., 368 F. App’x 133 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 
(repercussions for failure to adhere to TTAB’s authentication of evidence 
procedure); Univ. of S.C. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 367 F. App’x 129 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 387 (2010) (standing requirements); Found. for a Christian 
Civilization, Inc. v. Mary Queen of the Third Millenium, Inc., 360 F. App’x 150 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (standing requirements). 
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A. Motion for Leave to Amend 
1. Fred Beverages, Inc. v. Fred’s Capital Management Co. 
In Fred Beverages, Inc. v. Fred’s Capital Management Co.,242 the Federal 
Circuit held that the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner when it denied a motion for leave to amend a petition for 
cancellation of a registered trademark.243   
Fred Beverages, Inc. originally sought cancellation of Fred’s Capital 
Management Company’s registration in International Class 32 on the 
grounds of abandonment.244  The beverage company’s original 
petition for cancellation was accompanied by the $300.00 payment 
required by 37 C.F.R. § 2.6(a)(16).245  Subsequently, the beverage 
company filed a motion for leave to amend its cancellation petition 
to state new grounds of cancellation in connection with International 
Classes 2, 25, 28, and 29 of the twelve-class registration and to include 
fraud as an additional ground for cancellation of the registration in 
International Class 32.246  The Board denied the motion for leave to 
amend the cancellation petition because movant Fred Beverages, Inc. 
did not submit a $300.00 payment with its motion.247   
The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board had no legal basis 
for its decision.248  According to the Federal Circuit, 37 C.F.R. § 
2.6(a)(16) requires a $300.00 payment only with respect to the filing 
of a petition of cancellation.249  However, because there is no stated 
rule or established practice requiring that a motion for leave to 
amend a petition for cancellation be accompanied by a statutory fee 
corresponding to the classes for which cancellation is sought by 
amendment, there was no authority to support the Board’s 
decision.250   
Further, the Federal Circuit noted that in other cases, the Board 
granted or deferred ruling on motions for leave and set a subsequent 
deadline for the payment of the underlying fee.251  Because the Board 
departed here from established precedent without a reasoned 
                                                          
 242. 605 F.3d 963, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1958 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 243. Id. at 964, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958. 
 244. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958. 
 245. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958. 
 246. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959. 
 247. Id. at 965, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959. 
 248. Id. at 967, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960. 
 249. Id. at 966, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959. 
 250. Id. at 966–67, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959–60. 
 251. Id. at 967, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960. 
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explanation, the Federal Circuit vacated its decision as arbitrary and 
capricious.252   
B. Case or Controversy and Standing to Sue 
1. Green Edge Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Rubber Mulch Etc., L.L.C. 
In Green Edge Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Rubber Mulch Etc., L.L.C.,253 the 
Federal Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri’s dismissal of defendant Rubber Mulch’s 
counterclaim on the basis of lack of controversy.254  The Federal 
Circuit held that a cease and desist letter threatening suit and a 
current trademark infringement claim constituted sufficient case or 
controversy to permit Rubber Mulch to proceed with its 
counterclaim.255  Rubber Mulch sought a declaratory judgment of 
noninfringement against both the plaintiff and the third-party 
trademark assignee, International Mulch, brought into the case by 
the defendants as a second counterclaim defendant.256  The Federal 
Circuit also affirmed the district court’s decision finding no case or 
controversy and dismissing defendant Rubber Resources’ 
counterclaims because the trademark infringement claim did not 
extend to Rubber Resources, nor had it been a recipient of a cease 
and desist letter.257  The Federal Circuit explained that only the party 
with legal title to the mark is entitled to prosecute an infringement 
suit.258 
Ruling in favor of International Mulch on its motion for summary 
judgment, the District Court found that no case or controversy 
existed because International Mulch had not demanded in its cease 
and desist letter that Rubber Mulch cease using the mark.259  The 
District Court found that although Rubber Mulch did have a 
reasonable apprehension of litigation as a result of the cease and 
desist letter, no case or controversy existed because Rubber Mulch 
had not demonstrated that it intended to use “Rubber Mulch” as a 
                                                          
 252. See id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960 (citing Pontchartrain Broad. Co. v FCC, 
15 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1994) and Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 554 v. 
Salem-Gravure, 843 F.2d 1490, 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1988) for the proposition that, where 
an agency “depart[s] from established precedent without a reasoned explanation 
[its] decisions will be vacated as arbitrary and capricious”).   
 253. 620 F.3d 1287, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 254. Id. at 1290, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
 255. Id. at 1301, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 256. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 257. Id. at 1302, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 258. Id. at 1301, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 259. Id. at 1292–93, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428. 
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trademark, and instead planned only to use it descriptively.260  The 
defendants appealed the dismissal of their counterclaims. 
The Federal Circuit found appellee International Mulch’s 
arguments that Rubber Mulch claimed the term was not being used 
as a trademark and was only descriptive were “disingenuous” because 
Rubber Mulch stated that it did intend to continue using the phrase 
“Rubber Mulch.”261  The Federal Circuit found that those arguments 
related to Rubber Mulch’s defenses to the plaintiff’s infringement 
claim, and did not impact whether a case or controversy existed with 
respect to Rubber Mulch’s noninfringement and invalidity 
counterclaims.262  Instead, the Federal Circuit held that its analysis 
with respect to whether a case or controversy existed was satisfied,  as 
both the plaintiff and International Mulch accused Rubber Mulch of 
“infringing a valid trademark, which is the hallmark of an actual 
controversy.”263   
During the appellate hearing, International Mulch (the alleged 
assignee of the plaintiff’s trademark) sought to influence the Federal 
Circuit’s determination regarding case or controversy with respect to 
the counterclaims by representing that the plaintiff was prepared to 
drop its trademark infringement claim against Rubber Mulch 
entirely.264  The Federal Circuit clarified that the plaintiff’s offer to 
dismiss the infringement claim did not divest the court of its 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.265 
In discussing the fact that the legal title to the mark allegedly 
infringed upon was in question, the Federal Circuit also reiterated 
that only the party with the legal title to the mark was entitled to 
prosecute an infringement suit, and that “if International Mulch 
[was] found to be the legitimate assignee, only [it would have] 
standing to sue for infringement.”266  The Federal Circuit explained 
that in such circumstances, a “court may not dismiss an action for 
failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, 
after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real 
party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.”267  
Here, the Federal Circuit stated that if plaintiff Green Edge was 
“ultimately found not to have standing to pursue its infringement 
                                                          
 260. Id. at 1293, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428–29. 
 261. Id. at 1301–02, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 262. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 263. Id. at 1302, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 264. Id. at 1301 n.4, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 n.4.  
 265. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 n.4. 
 266. Id. at 1301, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 267. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435 (citing In re Signal Int’l, L.L.C., 579 F.3d 
478, 487 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(3))).  
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claim,” International Mulch could be substituted as the party in 
interest.268  
C. Default Judgment; Ordering of Determination of Multiple Motions; 
Timing of Suspension 
1. Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc. 
In Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc.,269 the Federal Circuit vacated the 
TTAB’s entry of a default judgment against the respondent in a 
cancellation proceeding and remanded the case.270  While noting the 
TTAB’s apparent failure to discuss its own rule, Trademark Rule 
2.217(d), in its opinion below, the Federal Circuit refrained from 
ruling on the rule’s applicability in the first instance and instead 
vacated the lower decision of the TTAB.271  Trademark Rule 2.127(d) 
relates to suspension of proceedings upon filing dispositive 
motions.272   
Petitioner Super Bakery filed a motion to compel discovery 
responses from the pro se respondent, Benedict, who failed to comply 
with the TTAB’s order directing responses to the petitioner.273  
Instead of granting Super Bakery’s motion for a default judgment, 
the TTAB gave Benedict a second chance to produce discovery 
responses.274  The day before the TTAB’s second established deadline, 
Benedict filed a motion for summary judgment instead of producing 
discovery.275  In response, the TTAB granted Super Bakery’s motion 
for sanctions and for default judgment.276 
The Federal Circuit pointed to Trademark Rule 2.127(d), which 
provides, “[w]hen any party files . . . a motion for summary 
judgment . . . the case will be suspended . . . with respect to all 
matters not germane to the motion and no party should file any 
paper which is not germane to the motion . . . .”277  Though it 
disagreed with the appellant’s interpretation of Trademark Rule 
2.127(d) that his discovery production requirements became 
suspended once he had filed his summary judgment motion the day 
before his discovery obligations were due, the Federal Circuit noted 
that the TTAB failed to address the applicability of Trademark Rule 
                                                          
 268. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 269. 367 F. App’x 161 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 270. Id. at 162–63. 
 271. Id. at 163. 
 272. Id. at 162; 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d). 
 273. Super Bakery, 367 F. App’x at 162. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id.  
 276. Id. 
 277. Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d) (2010). 
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2.127(d) in its decision.278  Thus, the court remanded the case back to 
the TTAB.279 
On remand, the TTAB held, in a precedential decision, that the 
filing of a motion for summary judgment, or other dispositive 
motion, does not automatically suspend a proceeding and noted that 
the same conclusion was reached during the rulemaking process for 
Trademark Rule 2.127(d).280  The TTAB held that only an order of 
the TTAB formally suspending the proceedings has such effect from 
the date of the suspension forward, unless otherwise indicated by the 
TTAB in the suspension order.281   
Here, the TTAB’s suspension order did not issue until after 
Benedict’s discovery responses were due.282  The TTAB held that the 
pendency of Benedict’s “clearly meritless” motion did not, in this 
case, constitute good cause for failing to comply with the TTAB’s 
prior order.283  The TTAB, therefore, held that the applicability of 37 
C.F.R. § 2.127(d) did not change its decision to enter judgment 
against the respondent and to cancel his registration.284 
Although an unpublished opinion,285 Benedict stands as yet another 
reminder to the TTAB that it must not ignore its own stated 
procedural rules.  Despite the TTAB’s and the opposing party’s 
apparent frustration with Benedict’s actions before the TTAB,286 the 
TTAB must at least address applicable procedural issues in its 
decisions, particularly where, as here, the decision resulted in a 
judgment against the respondent. 
D. Treatment of Non-Response to Motion 
1. Sadeh v. Biggs 
In Sadeh v. Biggs,287 the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s 
dismissal of the subject opposition with prejudice and affirmed its 
denial of a motion for reconsideration.288  The opposer failed to 
                                                          
 278. Super Bakery, 367 F. App’x at 162–63. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Super Bakery, Inc. v. Benedict, No. 92047859, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 384, at *5, 
96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1134, 1136 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 16, 2010). 
 281. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 282. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 283. Id. at *6–7, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 284. Id. at *8, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 285. But see infra text accompanying note 311 (discussing that citation to 
nonprecedential decisions is acceptable in certain contexts). 
 286. Benedict v. Super Bakery, 367 F. App’x 161, 163 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam); Super Bakery, Inc., 2010 TTAB LEXIS 384, at *7–8, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1136.  
 287. 374 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 288. Id. at 997. 
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provide any response to the applicant’s motion to dismiss, and could 
not, on appeal, proffer an adequate explanation for failing to do so.289  
Instead, the opposer argued on appeal that he was not obliged to 
respond to the motion to dismiss because he felt his notice of 
opposition was “bullet proof,” and he did not argue that extenuating 
circumstances existed justifying his failure to respond.290  In an 
unpublished opinion, the Federal Circuit stated that “[l]itigation is 
run by rules designed to assure orderly conduct of the proceedings” 
and held that the TTAB did not abuse its discretion in granting the 
applicant’s motion to dismiss as conceded, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 
2.127(a).291 
E. Motion for Vacatur and Remand; Appeal Moot   
1. In re Hyatt 
In In re Hyatt,292 the Federal Circuit vacated the underlying decision 
of the TTAB in an ex parte appeal in which the TTAB had affirmed 
the refusal of the appellant’s application on the basis of likelihood of 
confusion with a prior registration.293  The court remanded the case 
to the TTAB pursuant to a motion of the Director of the Trademark 
Office which stated that the Federal Circuit appeal was now moot, as 
the Trademark Office had cancelled the registration upon which 
denial of the appellant’s application was based just four days prior to 
the parties’ scheduled oral argument before the Federal Circuit.294  
Of note, the Director also informed the Federal Circuit that 
“procedures are being put in place to check registration status prior 
to oral argument to prevent a similar occurrence in the future.”295 
F. Federal Circuit Rule Compliance 
As the below three cases illustrate, an appellant’s entire appeal may 
be jeopardized and not heard on the merits if the appellant, or the 
appellant’s counsel, fails to strictly adhere to the procedural rules and 
timeline deadlines of the Federal Circuit.  
                                                          
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. (quoting Chesebrough-Pond’s Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 618 F.2d 776, 780, 205 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 888, 891 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). 
 292. No. 2009-1229, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26199 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 7, 2010). 
 293. Id.; see In re Hyatt, No. 76611740, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 106, at *3, *7, *16–17 
(T.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2008). 
 294. In re Hyatt, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26199, at *1; Director’s Opposed Motion 
for Vacatur and Remand at 1–2, In re Hyatt, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26199 (Feb. 6, 
2011), available at  
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=76611740&pty=EXA&eno=22. 
 295. Director’s Opposed Motion for Vacatur and Remand supra note 294, at 3. 
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1. Stoller v. Best Data Products, Inc. 
In Stoller v. Best Data Products, Inc.,296 perhaps the harshest 
application of its rules in 2010, the Federal Circuit denied as moot 
appellant Leo Stoller’s297 motion seeking an extension of time to file 
his opening brief immediately after dismissing the entire appeal 
because Stoller had failed to pay the Federal Circuit docketing fee 
that was due eight days earlier.298   
The appeal stemmed from a TTAB opposition proceeding related 
to an application for the mark STEALTH.  An application had been 
filed over a decade earlier in 1998, to which an opposition was 
sustained after the applicant, The Society for the Prevention of 
Trademark Abuse, L.L.C., filed to expressly abandon the 
application.299  Stoller filed the appeal after the TTAB refused 
initially, and again upon reconsideration, to substitute Stoller as the 
assignee applicant owner of the opposed STEALTH application.300  
Stoller moved for substitution and to extend his time to answer after 
the opposition had been sustained due to the current record holder’s 
express abandonment.301  The TTAB refused Stoller’s motions, citing 
a complete lack of evidence regarding the chain of title argued by 
Stoller.302   
Despite the fact that only eight days had passed between the 
docketing fee due date and the Federal Circuit’s dismissal of the 
appeal in an unpublished opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed its 
                                                          
 296. No. 2010-1031, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4354 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2010). 
 297. By way of background, it is notable that the judicial system seems to have run 
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3569/16/0.pdf?1272466371 (ordering all federal courts in the Seventh Circuit to 
“return unfiled any papers submitted either directly or indirectly by [Mr. Stoller] or 
on his behalf[,]” except for those relating to criminal cases and applications for writs 
of habeas corpus); see also Central Mfg. Co. v. Brett, No. 04-C-3049, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
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at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2010). 
 299. Best Data Prods., Inc. v. Soc’y for Prevention of Trademark Abuse, L.L.C., 
No. 91190926 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 1, 2009). 
 300. See id. (denying Stoller’s request for reconsideration and affirming the 
Board’s August 5, 2009 order, as modified by the Board’s August 7, 2009 order). 
 301. Motion to Substitute Party, Best Data Prods., Inc. v. Leo Stoller, Opposition 
No. 91190926 (T.T.A.B. 2009), available at 
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91190926&pty=OPP&eno=4. 
 302. See Best Data Prods., Opposition No. 91190926 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 1, 2009), 
available at http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=76611740&pty=EXA&eno=22 
(denying Stoller’s request for reconsideration and affirming the Board’s August 5, 
2009 order, as modified by the Board’s August 7, 2009 order). 
1198 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1159 
decision upon Stoller’s motion for reconsideration.303  While the best 
practice to take away from this opinion is to strictly adhere to all 
procedural deadlines of the Federal Circuit, one cannot help but 
wonder whether similar treatment would have befallen an appellant 
who did not have Stoller’s reputation and had not previously brought 
appeals before the Federal Circuit on more than fifteen occasions.  
2. In re Achenbach Buschhutten GmbH 
In re Achenbach Buschhutten GmbH304 also highlighted the need to 
strictly follow the rules of the Federal Circuit.  In that case, the 
attorney for trademark applicant Achenbach Buschhutten GmbH 
appealed the TTAB’s affirmation of the Examining Attorney’s final 
refusal to register the proposed mark OPTIFOIL (and Design) under 
Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.305  Counsel for Achenbach failed to 
become a member of the Federal Circuit bar as required by Federal 
Circuit Rule 46, and the Federal Circuit therefore dismissed the 
appeal for failure to prosecute in accordance with the rules.306 
3. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin v. Amerisure Mutual 
Insurance Co. 
General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin v. Amerisure Mutual Insurance Co.307 
provides another example of the Federal Circuit’s strict application of 
its rules, to the detriment of appellants.  General Casualty Co. failed 
to timely file its appellate brief, as required by Federal Circuit Rule 
31(a).308  Citing the same rule, the Federal Circuit dismissed the 
appeal.309 
CONCLUSION 
All told, the Federal Circuit did not promulgate any momentous 
advances or changes in trademark law in 2010.  This is not to say that 
it was not a busy year for the Federal Circuit, as the number of 
trademark cases decided by the court in 2010 was in line with recent 
years, and the court’s decision to designate only eight of the twenty-
three trademark cases as precedential was also comparable to recent 
years.310  In any event, the cases surveyed herein may be useful for 
                                                          
 303. Stoller, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4354, at *1. 
 304. No. 2010-1192, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12248 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2010). 
 305. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006); In re Achenbach Buschutten GbmH, No. 
76581689, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 650 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2009).  
 306. In re Achenbach, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12248, at *1.  
 307. No. 2010-1422, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26870 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2010).   
 308. Id. at *1.   
 309. Id.   
 310. The Federal Circuit issued sixteen trademark decisions in 2009 (including 
nine designated precedential), eight trademark decisions in 2008 (one designated 
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similarly situated litigants.  Practitioners are reminded that since the 
adoption of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, all federal 
opinions, including those of the Federal Circuit, issued on or after 
January 1, 2007, are citable in all federal courts even if designated as 
unpublished or nonprecedential.311  Further, the Federal Circuit may 
refer to nonprecedential dispositions in opinions or orders and may 
look to nonprecedential dispositions for guidance or persuasive 
reasoning.312  The decision of the court to affirm four judgments in 
2010 without opinion reflects the court’s determination that an 
opinion in those cases would have no precedential value,313 but these 
cases should not be overlooked by practitioners who may wish to 
supplement other authority.   
Practitioners should be aware that this article is a survey only of 
2010 trademark judgments issued by the Federal Circuit.  Opinions 
issued by the Federal Circuit in 2010 involving other substantive areas 
of the law may also impact trademark law practice but are not 
considered or discussed herein. 
 
                                                          
precedential), fifteen trademark decisions in 2007 (eight designated precedential), 
eleven trademark decisions in 2006 (seven designated precedential), and twelve 
trademark decisions in 2005 (six designated precedential).  See Stephen R. Baird, 
2005 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1263, 1263–64 (2006); 
Stephanie H. Bald & David M. Kelly, 2008 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal 
Circuit, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 947, 948 (2009); Rebeccah Gan, 2009 Trademark Law 
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2010); Christine Haight 
Farley & Geri L. Haight, Review of the 2006 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 987, 988 (2007); David Jaquette & Susan M. Kayser, 2007 Trademark 
Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (2008).   
 311. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1; FED. CIR. R. 32.1(c).  By way of comparison, TTAB 
decisions not designed as precedential “are not citable authority and will not be 
considered by the Board.”  TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF 
PROCEDURE § 1203.02(f) (2004).   
 312. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(d). 
 313. FED. CIR. R. 36.  We note that in all four instances the underlying TTAB 
opinion was also nonprecedential. 
